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ABSTRACT: The debate about “politics and religion” has already rejected essentialist claims of fundamen-
tal differences in the impact of religion on politics in different cultures. This article will argue that political 
Islam in Turkey and political Catholicism in Italy and Germany adopted remarkably similar patterns of 
cross-class coalitions and policies for a “reconciliation of capitalism and democracy”. First, religious parties 
developed as mass integration parties which already encompassed cross-class coalitions. Second, in the 
aftermath of political and economic crises these parties transformed into catch-all parties with a pro-
nounced neo-liberal agenda which was given a religious justification. Third, at the same time these parties 
continued to sponsor policies and organizations which cushioned and supplemented an uneven economic 
development. Fourth, the parties kept traditional family policies which helped attracting a significant fe-
male electorate. “Organized religion” provided religious parties with a potential electorate, ancillary or-
ganizations and ideological concepts; however, their role in this political evolution changed. The conclu-
sion will discuss whether these findings can be generalized. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Diversity has been for some time a paradigm for comparing religions and cultures, and led to 
a focus on their differences even if linked to a call for tolerance and the appreciation of diversi-
ty. An essentialist view on “politics and religion” has even argued that due to the divergent con-
ceptions of the relationship between politics and religion, Christianity and democracy were as 
closely linked as Islam and authoritarianism (Huntington 1993). This essentialist analysis of the 
relationship between politics and religion has been comprehensively criticized in recent years. 
Empirical comparative research on contemporary societies has concluded that there are only 
minor differences in the population’s democratic values between the different denominations 
and cultures whereas values differ significantly in regard to gender relations (Gerhards 2007; 
Inglehart and Norris 2000). In addition, the separation of state and church is rather an idealized 
self-conception of western democracies than an adequate analysis of the actual relationship be-
tween state and church (Stepan 2001)
1
.  
Moreover, historical analyses have concluded that, contrary to today’s public perception, the 
Catholic Church was for a significant time in the past “the historical antagonist to liberal democ-
racy” (Minkenberg 2007, 804; see also Stepan 2001; Warner 2002). Whereas Protestantism 
tended to bolster democracy and civil liberties as the unintended consequence of its historical 
struggle against the theocratic aspirations of the Catholic Church, the Catholic Church only fully 
reconciled itself with democracy in the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). “The ultramontane 
and anti-liberal origins of much of the social Catholicism and Christian Democracy of the late-
nineteenth century are now widely accepted by historians” (Conway 2001, 308). Several au-
thors have also highlighted anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies in the policies and pol-
itics of the Vatican and of Catholic parties in the Western Europe of the 1930s. The popes Pius 
XI (1922-1939) and Pius XII (1939-1958) held at least for some time a benevolent view of the 
authoritarian regimes of Portugal and Spain and actively supported the Vichy regime in France 
and the proto-fascist Dollfus regime in Austria because of their authoritarian corporatism and 
despite their openly undemocratic character (Warner 2002). In fact, countries with fascist re-
gimes were almost all Catholic whereas those countries that avoided dictatorship were all 
Protestant (Minkenberg 2007, 895).  
On the other hand, several authors have pointed out that the contemporary “democratic un-
derdevelopment” of Islamic countries has a number of non-religious motives, in particular in 
Arab countries. The politics of Islamic countries are complicated by geopolitical factors; “region-
al factors outweigh religious ones in the Arab world” (Minkenberg 2007, 903). Finally, there is a 
consensus on the “multivocality” of religion (Stepan 2001, 223): Religious tenets can be used to 
justify both democratic and autocratic policies; “religious doctrine is a contested field of mean-
ing amenable to a multiplicity of meaning” (Kalyvas 2003). Thus, it seems fair to say that the ac-
 
1
 In addition, it has been claimed that much of the Islamic tradition entailed a “de facto separation of 
religion and state” (Driessen 2013, 13). 
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ademic debate has so far concluded that differences in the “political impact of religions”, in par-
ticular between Christianity and Islam, have been vastly overestimated and essentialist claims of 
principal differences have been falsified. 
In contrast, a new strand of literature has taken the opposite approach and focused on simi-
larities in the comparison of today’s religious parties with Europe’s religious parties in the late 
19
th
 and early 20th century (see Kalyvas 2000) in the “politicization of religion” (Altinordu 2010).  
Stathis Kalyvas (2003) has compared religious mobilization in Catholic, Islamist and Hindu par-
ties and highlighted the communalities of an anti-system critique, the reconstruction of a reli-
gious identity, mass mobilization through selective incentives and the establishment of a cross-
class alliance. “Muslim democracy” has become a prominent concept in this regard (Nasr 2005; 
Hale 2005). It presumes that political Islam could transform into Muslim democracy just as polit-
ical Catholicism has transformed into Christian democracy; “the imperative of competition in-
herent in democracy will transform the unsecular tendencies of Muslim Democracy” (Nasr 
2005, 15). 
However, whereas essentialist approaches have “invested religious ideas and traditions with 
an over-determinate force on political outcome”, there is a tendency towards “stripping reli-
gious ideas and traditions of any particular effect” (Driessen 2013, 3) in a functionalist analysis 
of the role of religion in the development of political parties. Religion has been portrayed as 
providing the cement for a cross-class platform (Nasr 2005). Ates Altinordu has analyzed reli-
gious revivalism as a trigger for a revival-reaction-politicization process; it provoked social coun-
ter-mobilization and state pressure, which in turn bolstered the political organization of reli-
gious parties and produced successful religious parties (Altinordu 2010). Kalyvas’ much debated 
comparison between the ascent to power of the Algerian Islamist party in the 1990s (aborted by 
a military coup) and the Catholic party in Belgium in the 1890s concluded that the Catholic 
Church - in contrast to the “decentralized” Islam in Algeria – could provide the guarantee for 
incumbents that political Catholicism would moderate (Kalyvas 2000). These influential case 
studies have dealt with the emergence of religious parties and their ascendance to power; they 
seem to insinuate that religion provides the resources to establish successful parties whilst, 
when they come to power, a different “game” starts. Thus, the influence of religion on the con-
tent of the political struggle, or to put it differently, on policies and politics beyond the narrow-
defined realm of religious activities and symbols has often been neglected (for an exception see 
Hale 2005).  
This article will therefore focus on the evolution of political Catholicism and political Islam, 
and address the question whether the development of parties, which have originated in the po-
litical mobilization of these different religions, reveals common characteristics. Does religion, 
both in political Islam or political Catholicism, infuse a specific set of policies and politics? For 
this purpose the article will compare the development of the German CDU (Christlich Demo-
kratische Union – Christian Democratic Union) and the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (Christian 
Democracy) as examples of Christian democrats with the development of the Turkish AKP (Ada-
let ve Kalkinma Partisi - Justice and Development Party).  
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The Turkish AKP has been given as the benchmark and possibly “the best picture of what 
Muslim Democracy might become and what it might stand for” (Nasr 2005:23) because its 
emergence occurred within the context of decades of democratic development (and authoritar-
ian backlashes) since the establishment of an electoral democracy in Turkey in 1950. In Western 
Europe, Christian democratic parties have been most influential in Germany and Italy since 
they, first, dominated the politics of two core member states of the European Union and, sec-
ond, could enact their policies most “undiluted” as they led coalitions with much smaller liberal 
parties. Christian democrats had emerged earlier in the Netherlands and Belgium (both defined 
by the use of the very name or by their full commitment to democracy), however, like Austria, 
these small states tended to produce consociational systems in which grand coalitions of Chris-
tian democrats and socialists would negotiate policies (Morgan 2009).  
The article will use classic party theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kirchheimer 1965) to ana-
lyze the development of political parties in the context of nation-state building, democratization 
and industrialization. In addition, the article will link the debate on “Muslim democracy” (Hale 
2005; Nasr 2005) to a re-awakened interest in the history of Christian democracy (Kalyvas and 
van Kersbergen 2010; Misner 2003; Conway 2001, 2003; Warner 2002). The article will argue 
that Christian democrats and Muslim democrats have – despite differences in detail – found 
remarkably similar approaches to “reconcile capitalism and democracy”. Independent of each 
other, both the policies of Christian democrats (Misner 2003) and of the AKP (Önis 2012) have 
been characterized as “third way thinking” in their rejection of both socialism and liberalism. 
However, this does not exclude authoritarian tendencies and turns and the later degeneration 
of parties – as occurred in the case of the DC
2
. 
The article will make four propositions about the evolution of political Catholicism and politi-
cal Islam in the cases examined here. First, it will argue that, due to the conflict with the nation 
state, political Catholicism in Germany and Italy and political Islam in Turkey organized in the 
form of mass integration parties (see Kirchheimer 1965). These mass integration parties en-
compassed a specific cross-class alliance and took their distance to both conservatives and so-
cialists or social democrats.  Second, in the aftermath of a political crisis, Catholic and Islamic 
parties transformed into catch-all parties with a pronounced neo-liberal economic agenda 
which was given a religious justification. Third, they nevertheless pursued cross-class politics 
and policies, in particular in Catholic or Islamic socioeconomic milieus, through specific social 
policies and a general emphasis on intermediary organizations. Fourth, what is given as a major 
difference between Muslim and Christian states, is in historical analysis a common feature of 
the Muslim democrat AKP and the early CDU and DC: the emphasis on traditional family politics 
and the attraction it (from western Europe’s contemporary view counter-intuitively) exerted on 
a female electorate.  
 
2
 It is beyond the scope of the article to analyse these developments which, however, seem to be nega-
tively correlated to “religious influence”: The DC  started under the leadership of Amintore Fanfani to use 
clientelism not least to reduce its dependence on the Catholic Church; the AKP’s current authoritarian and 
“neopatrimonialist” turn goes along with intense conflicts with the influential religious Gülen movement.  
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The article will examine the role “religion”
3
 played in this evolution of political Catholicism 
and political Islam by providing (i) a potential electorate among the practicing or devout part of 
the population, (ii) organizations ranging from churches to religiously based professional organi-
zations and (iii) elements of an ideology, i.e. religious tenets developed by and around orga-
nized religion. The conclusion will discuss to which extent these findings can be generalized.  
 
 
2. Catholic parties as mass integration parties  
 
The classical school of historical sociology has explained the emergence of religious parties as 
one of the structural consequences of the historical junctures of democratization and nation-
state building. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) have argued that the state-church 
(or religious-secular) cleavage is one of the basic cleavages in the development of a modern 
party system because the “development of compulsory education under centralized secular 
control for all children of the nation came into direct conflict with the established rights of the 
religious pouvoirs intermediares and triggered waves of mass mobilization into nationwide par-
ties of protest” (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 15). Ates Altinordu (2010) pointed out that “religious 
revivalism” preceded the nation-state’s attack on religious organizations as well as the counter-
mobilization of secular forces in the German (as well as in the Turkish) case. However, Altinordu 
agrees on the decisive role of state repression in “forcing” Catholic (and Muslim) activists to 
unite in one single party despite the diverging interests and position of different groups within 
the movement (see also Driessen 2013).  
The conflict between nascent or consolidating nation states and the Catholic Church’s “ul-
tramontane counteroffensive” (Ertman 2009) reached its peak in the 1860s and 1870s in Italy 
and Germany. The most salient attack on the Catholic Church was the annexation of the largest 
part of the Vatican state in the making of the Italian nation state in 1862 and 1871. It deprived 
the Vatican State nearly entirely of its territory, which had covered a large part of central Italy. 
As a reaction, the Vatican forbade the participation of Catholics in Italian politics (the ”non ex-
pedit“ was fully reversed only after the First World War) and raised ”symbolic borders“ with the 
secular nation-state by elaborating on religious dogmas such as the infallibility of the pope. At 
about the same time, chancellor Otto von Bismarck, architect of the German nation state, 
waged a ”cultural battle“ („Kulturkampf“; 1870-1878) against the Catholic Church; hundreds of 
Catholic bishops and priests were in prison, Jesuit orders were ousted, priests were forbidden 
political statements and the state supervision of schools was imposed on the formerly responsi-
ble churches.  
The nation-state’s attack and social counter-mobilization (Altinordu 2010) led to a process, in 
which “these church movements tended to isolate their supporters from outside influence 
through the development of a wide variety of parallel organizations and agencies“ (Lipset and 
 
3
 Religion can be defined as encompassing “a creed, a cult, a code of conduct and a confessional com-
munity” (R. Scott Appleby as quoted in Driessen 2013, 11). 
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Rokkan 1967, 15). Political entrepreneurs could use this network of organizations to build mass 
integration parties which were closely embedded in a social milieu and represented the inter-
ests and values of this “counter-society”. Thus, Catholic parties stood in contrast to liberal and 
conservative parties of notables and resembled in their organizational form socialist worker 
parties. At the peak of the Kulturkampf, the Catholic Zentrum (Center Party; 1870-1933) gained, 
in 1874, 27.4 per cent of the votes which then slowly but continuously decreased during the 
Empire and the Weimar Republic. However, in contrast to socialist parties, the Catholic mass 
integration parties entailed cross-class coalitions reflecting the geographical and social distribu-
tion of the religious part of the population. They brought together the rural nobility, rural and 
urban middle classes and the religious part of the working class (Conway 2001; 2003). 
The Catholic Church turned to support these new mass parties and exerted an “ideational“ 
influence on them which, however, entailed both anti-liberal and anti-capitalist tenets. Pope 
Pius IX’s encyclical Syllabus Errorum (1864) enumerated what the Pope considered to be the 
mistakes of liberalism; among others he denounced freedom of speech and the belief that a re-
gime that did not repress the violations of the Catholic religion could be good (Kalyvas 2003, 
299; see also Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010). In addition, the papal encyclical Rerum Novar-
um (1890) used anti-capitalist thoughts and led to the development of a “Catholic social doc-
trine” by clerics such as Bishop von Ketteler and a number of Jesuits (Misner 2003).  
The German Center Party, representing the Catholic minority in Germany, turned after the 
end of the Kulturkampf towards a moderate political stance. Once it had replaced its anti-
liberalism with anti-socialism, it started to support together with conservatives and national lib-
erals the governments of the late German Empire. However, in the following decades, the Cen-
ter Party’s support for national minorities and its emphasis on social policies brought it nearer 
to social democrats and it switched its allegiance during the First World War towards the so-
called “Weimar coalition” with social democrats and left-liberals. The Center Party’s move and 
commitment to the new republic was contested within the party and the foundation of the Ba-
varian People’s Party in 1919 was the origin of today’s organizational independence of the Ba-
varian CSU (Christlich Soziale Union), united with the CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) in a 
parliamentary party. Subsequently, the Center Party as well as the short-lived Italian Partito Po-
polare (PPI, Italian People’s Party, 1919-1926) strived for organizational independence from the 
Catholic Church; however, even in the interwar period, the “informal influence of Catholic prel-
ates and priests within the national and particularly the local counsels of Catholic parties was 
still substantial” (Conway 2001,  300).   
The Center Party as well as the Italian Partito Popolare, in which many regarded the Center 
Party as an example to imitate, positioned themselves in the middle of the political spectrum. 
However, due to the economic crisis and the radicalization of the political Left and political 
Right towards the end of the “Weimar Republic”, it proved to be increasingly difficult to bridge 
their different milieus, in particular after the industrialization had strengthened the Catholic 
workers’ milieu.  Splits between the rural and the urban electorate and the bourgeoisie and the 
workers’ milieus opened up and led to the Center Party’s authoritarian turn (Conway 2003).  
The PPI faced after its great electoral success of 1919 similar problems. The Italian fascists were 
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the beneficiaries of the PPI’s inability to reconcile the interests of their urban supporters with 
those of a rural population radicalized by economic difficulties and the Socialist unionization of 
agricultural laborers (Conway 2003, 305). The PPI consented to individuals participating in the 
first Fascist government but left the parliament after the Matteotti murder in 1922 together 
with socialists and communists (di Maio 2001). 
Thus, whilst Catholic mass integration parties were closely linked to their electorates by reli-
gious ancillary organizations and a religiously inspired program as well as the defense of the in-
terests of the Catholic Church, they failed to reach out to a wider electorate and devise a sus-
tainable economic program in the interwar period. Most tragically for West-European history 
was the Vatican’s withdrawal of support for the German and Italian Catholic parties once the 
Vatican’s accord with the Italian fascist regime in 1929 (Lateran Treaties) and the German na-
tional socialist regime in the Concordat of 1933 had secured the Church’s existence, pastoral 
freedom and the continuation of religious instruction. 
 
 
3. Turkish Islamist parties as mass integration parties  
 
Nation-state building in Turkey triggered a confrontation between the liberal nation-state 
building elite and organized religion which was, like in Italy, particularly intense as the state at-
tacked the organizational center of an entire religious belief. However, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
went even a step further than the Italian nation-state builders in that he abolished the Caliphate 
as the highest religious authority for Muslims in and outside of Turkey; after the Sheikh Said re-
bellion in 1925 religious orders were suppressed and their property confiscated. Moreover, Ata-
türk imbued the new state elite with a secular ideology that aimed to ban religion from the pub-
lic space and established a form of secularism which went beyond that of most western Euro-
pean states (Stepan 2001). 
However, “starting in 1950s religious orders carefully expanded their activities and followers 
and bargained with political parties for favors in return for support in elections” (Altinordu 
2010, 528). According to Cinar and Duran, the conservative parties’ “instrumentalization of Is-
lam“ continued until the early 1990s (Cinar and Duran 2008, 28). In the 1970s and 1980s, inter-
national Islamic revival movements as well as the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis”, which the military 
endorsed after the military coup of 1980 to promote a “controlled Islamization” of society, 
paved the way for the Milli Görüs (National Order) movement (Altinordu 2010). The foundation 
of the National Order Party in 1970 by Necmettin Erbakan, for two decades the dominating po-
litical entrepreneur in political Islam in Turkey, was strongly encouraged by Mehmet Zahit 
Kotku, sheikh of the Naksibendi. Nurcu groups also joined the party but left it already in 1977 
due to policy differences (Hale and Özbudun 2010).  
Islamist parties represented devout small Anatolian merchants and business people, i.e. the 
rural petit bourgeoisie in the Turkish periphery, which had kept religious traditions in spite of 
the secularization by the Kemalist state elite, and their economic interests against the large 
state-oriented big business in the west of Turkey. The National Order parties’ religious mobiliza-
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tion used rhetorical attacks against secularism and capitalism and ”the West“ and aimed at re-
storing the place of religion in society. Like the National Order Party (1970-71) and the National 
Salvation Party (1972-1980), even the Welfare Party (1983-1997) “proposed an Islamic inspired 
'just order' that it conceives as a third way, different from and superior to both capitalism and 
socialism” (Tepe 2008: 89). The National Salvation Party entered a coalition with the Republi-
can’s People Party in the year 1974 only to shift to a right-wing coalition government in 1975. 
However, in many respects Islamist parties did not comply with the Kemalist secular state doc-
trine and the National Order Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1971 and the 
National Salvation Party in 1980 by a military coup.  
With the establishment of the Welfare Party (in 1983; Erbakan returned to lead the party in 
1987); the social composition of the electorate changed significantly (Yavuz 2009; Özbudun 
2000; Tepe 2008). In the 1990s, internal migration brought parts of a rural, religiously tradition-
al population into the city. As a consequence, the Welfare Party (WP) could enlarge its elec-
torate, and had its candidates elected mayors in large cities, most notably Ankara and Istanbul. 
Its social base was broadened by inroads in an increasing urban “Muslim bourgeoisie” but also 
in the neighborhoods of the ”urban poor“, often migrants from peripheral areas, supported by 
ancillary welfare and other non-governmental organizations. “Organizationally, the WP is the 
only Turkish party that comes close to the model of a mass party or a party of social integration. 
The Islamists in Turkey constitute a large number of associations, foundations, newspapers, pe-
riodicals, publishing houses, TV networks, student dormitories, a pro-WP trade union and a pro-
WP businessperson’s association and holding companies, as well as informal groups such as var-
ious Sufi orders and other religious communities” (Özbudun 2000, 92).  
When the Welfare Party, after having obtained with 20.4 per cent of the votes its best elec-
tion result, built a coalition with conservatives in 1996, it was without a socioeconomic program 
which would take account of Turkey’s dependence on the IMF agreements. In contrast, it 
”played to the tribunes“ with radical discourses calling for a Muslim equivalent of EU, UN and 
NATO (Özbudun 2000). However, it did not prevent the Kemalist state elite from establishing 
close cooperation with Israel, anathema to the Islamists’ ideology. Representatives of the Wel-
fare Party continued to advocate Shari’a laws for a comprehensive regulation of private life alt-
hough their exact regulations were not specified and their repercussions in active politics sel-
dom exceeded the banning of alcohol (Toprak 2005).  
Although having failed to display a viable economic program, the Welfare Party had already 
“produced” a new generation of an economic and political elite at the local level and (to some 
extent) loosened its ties to religious movements. It is indicative that in 1997 the prominent Nur-
cu leader Fetullah Gülen openly supported the ”28 February process“ in which the military 
forced the Welfare Party-led coalition government to resign and the Welfare Party was subse-
quently ousted by the Constitutional Court (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 15). 
 
 
 
 
Joerg Baudner, Beyond essentialist and functionalist analyses of the politicization of religion 
 
119 
 
4. The transition from Catholic to Christian democratic parties 
 
The transformation of political Catholicism to Christian democracy in the aftermath of the 
Second World War was so comprehensive that it is still debated whether Christian Democratic 
parties can be regarded as a continuation of earlier Catholic parties (Conway 2003; Kalyvas and 
van Kersbergen 2010). However, leading politicians such as the leaders of the German and Ital-
ian Christian democrats after the Second World War, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi, 
stemmed from its predecessor parties; De Gasperi was the last secretary general of the PPI. 
More importantly, the difference between the pre- and postwar parties reflects the difference 
between a mass-integration and a catch-all party; thus, the national catastrophes caused by the 
Second World War greatly accelerated the party transformation (see also tab. 1). Already in the 
mid-1960s, Kirchheimer enlisted as the characteristics of the catch-all party (i) the prevalence of 
short-term tactical considerations over ideological coherence, (ii) the strengthening of the party 
leadership and its orientation on the social system, (iii) the devaluation of the role of the indi-
vidual party members, (iv) election campaigns which address all parts of society and (v) the at-
tempt to connect to the various interest organizations (Kirchheimer 1965, 32).  
It was only after the Second World War and the devastating consequences of extreme na-
tionalist policies that Christian democratic parties fully endorsed democracy, started to address 
a non-religious electorate and weakened their ties to the Catholic subculture. Moreover, they 
were able to pursue a viable interclass socioeconomic program in which the role of religious 
references changed considerably. In postwar Germany, the CDU opened up to Protestants (alt-
hough the majority of Protestants in Germany continued voting for social democrats). In fact, in 
the aftermath of the Second World War Christian democrats attracted an extraordinarily broad 
cross-class electorate, ranging from big business to Catholic manual workers and advocates of 
“Christian socialism”. In addition, party leaders Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi had an 
unprecedented dominance in the party because of the difficult re-establishment of the national 
party organizations (Panebianco 1988).  
It was, in particular, the adoption of neoliberal economic thinking which allowed the parties 
to appeal to an electorate which was “approachable” after the competing parties on the right 
had been hugely (Italy) or entirely (Germany) discredited. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
both the German CDU and the Italian DC carried out comprehensive programs of privatization, 
reduced state regulations on prices and rigorously pursued the aim of low inflation. The eco-
nomic concept of  “ordo-liberal” or “neo-liberal” policies in the 1940s and 1950s entailed anti-
cartel policies and state intervention in case of market failure. However, it was only in the late 
1950s that major social policies were added, in Italy with a clientelist distortion. 
The “remarkable transition from social corporatism to a largely free-market system” (Conway 
2003, 55) had repercussions on the inner-party balance. Although Christian democrats repre-
sented beyond their core ”farmers-middle classes coalition“ (Conway 2003, 57) also a ”left 
wing“ and worker electorate, the presence of trade unions was reduced (and subsequently 
trade unions distanced themselves from Christian democratic parties) whereas CDU and DC se-
cured the support of big business. Large companies started to massively support Christian dem-
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ocrats with party funding. In addition, the Catholic Church intervened massively to support 
Christian democrats, in particular in Italy where it even threatened to excommunicate those 
who vote for communist candidates (Warner 2002). 
 
Tab. 1: The evolution in the politicization of religion in Germany, Italy and Turkey 
 Germany  Italy Turkey 
Nation-state building com-
pleted 
1871 1872 1922 
Attack of nation-state 
building elite on church 
”Cultural battle“  
1870-78 
Annexation of most of the 
Vatican state 1861, 1870 
Abolition of the Caliphate 
1924 
Political mobilization of 
religion 
Immediate  
(but minority in Germany 
1870-1933) 
Delayed by pope’s ”non-
expedit“ 
Delayed by oppression 
Religious or “confessional” 
parties 
Center Party  PPI National Order Party, 
National Salvation Party, 
Welfare Party 
Exogenous conditions for 
transformation into catch-
all party 
Second World War, US 
“Marshal fund” and Euro-
pean integration 
Like in Germany Economic and political cri-
sis 1999/2001; IWF loans, 
EU accession negotiations 
Religions and dominant 
political affiliation 
Catholic - CDU 
Protestant - SPD 
Catholic - DC Muslim Sunni - AKP 
Alevi - CHP 
 
Moreover, neoliberal policies were justified by “an anti-materialist conception of the econo-
my” which “stressed economic reconstruction as a precondition for the primary goal of re-
establishing an organic, Christian society” (Spicka 2007, 13). According to many Catholics, the 
experience of the war demanded a “categorical return to the teachings of the Catholic faith” 
and a “re-christianization of the German society” (Conway 2003: 51). In addition, “there was 
much in the Christian Democrats politics of that era which recalled the rather undemocratic 
mentalities of the inter-war years” (Conway 2001: 309). In the following decades, mass mem-
bership (which was even to grow) and the rhetoric of an already discarded religious ideology 
continued to provide the cement for the party organizations and the link to their core elec-
torate. Accordingly, church-attendance remained for decades a good predictor of Christian 
democratic voting. For instance, as late as in 1976, 64 per cent of Catholics and 84 per cent of 
devout Catholics in Germany voted CDU (Emmert et.al. 2001, 70).  
 
 
5. The transition from the Welfare Party to the AKP  
 
In Turkey, it was the AKP’s ascent to power in the aftermath of the political crisis of 1997 and 
the economic crisis of 1999-2001 (Önis 2006) which characterized a clear break in the develop-
ment of political Islam. The establishment of the AKP in 2001 completed the transformation 
from an Islamist party into a catch-all party with religious roots (see Toprak 2005; Hale and 
Özbudun 2010) in neat correspondence with Kirchheimer’s criteria mentioned above. First, the 
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AKP took its distance from its predecessor parties and replaced the religiously justified call for a 
Union of Muslim states and of a ”just order“ (“adil düzen“) with a pragmatic economic and for-
eign policy program. The AKP even took a pronounced liberal-market and conservative rhetoric 
on board (see Önis 2006). Second, the AKP mobilized around the charismatic leader Recep Tay-
yip Erdogan and promised thorough compliance with IMF and World Bank demands as well as 
with the EU accession conditions. Third, the party leadership gained more independence from 
the electorate and downplayed grassroots activism; ”unlike the parties of the National Order 
Movement, [it] does not want a strong grassroots movement“ and ”prefers a loose party organ-
ization which is based on some leading figures …and a charismatic party leadership which keeps 
different trends together“ (Duran 2008,  86).  
Fourth, the AKP started to address all groups of society and also secured the affiliation of a 
number of recognized politicians of other political orientations. It tried to leave its past as a reli-
gious party behind and described itself as a conservative party although most of its leading poli-
ticians had already been active in the Welfare Party. As a result, the AKP “has been extremely 
successful in constituting a cross-class electoral alliance” in contrast to the Center-left parties 
which had failed to construct a broad interclass alliance (Önis 2006, 209-11). Fifth, the AKP con-
nected to important interest organizations beyond its affiliated organizations. Among its sup-
porting organizations, the Muslim organization of prevalent small business’ MÜSIAD (Independ-
ent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) had already had the upper hand over the 
Muslim trade union Hak-Is when only 2 representatives of Hak-Is were elected on the AKP list 
for the 2002 elections compared with 21 members of MÜSIAD (Duran and Yilderim 2005, 227). 
The AKP’s rapprochement to organized big business represented by TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrial-
ists’ and Businessmen’s Association) was facilitated by the common interest in EU accession; 
TÜSIAD’s statements concerning the AKP’s determination to comply with IMF and EU accession 
requirements became even more supportive than MÜSIAD’s (Önis 2006, 223).  
In this similarly to Christian democrats after the Second World War, the AKP government 
turned from its predecessor parties‘ general criticism of liberalism and materialism to what has 
been labeled as the “marriage of Islam and neoliberalism” (Atasoy 2009): pronounced liberal 
market and monetarist policies. These encompassed in particular the privatization of state-
owned companies and the abolition of fixed prices or state subsidies for basic goods as well as a 
strict anti-inflation policy. For instance, the new tax law in 2006 reduced tax rates such as the 
corporation tax considerably whereas the social security reform has been quoted as an example 
for the abandoning of populist policies (Duran 2008). 
However, free market policies were given a justification in terms of religious references by 
“the party’s vision of society” as “organic and unified by Islamic values”;  preventing the inter-
ference of the Kemalist state would allow to combine individual freedom and community values 
as “Islamic and family values and agents of socialization seek to mould and discipline citizen be-
lievers with a sense of communal duty” (Yavuz 2009,  96). The major difference in the party 
transformation of Christian democrats and the AKP is that Christian democrats rapidly con-
verged with the economic and state elite after the Second World War, mainly due to the pre-
ceding national catastrophe and the dawning anti-communism. By contrast, Turkey witnessed  a 
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period in which a staunchly secular state elite kept is resistance against the AKP whilst the es-
tablished economic elite had found common interests in the opening to globalization and acces-
sion to the European Union (Önis 2006).  
 
 
6. Cushioning free-market policies: Catholic ideology and cross-class politics 
 
It would be misleading to reduce Christian democrats’ role in socioeconomic development to 
their free-market policies. Christian democrats swiftly discarded an anti-capitalist rhetoric, 
which had characterized for instance the CDU’s ”Ahlener Program“ of 1947 or the Dossetti fac-
tion in the DC, for the technocratic discourse and program of a liberalist economic school. How-
ever, “social Catholicism”, encompassing a religiously inspired “social doctine” and  religiously 
based organizations, remained influential (i) in socio-economic milieus in economically lagging 
regions, (ii) in welfare organizations and social policies and (iii) in a general emphasis on inter-
mediary organizations. 
Social Catholicism conceived politics as founded upon a notion of harmony between all 
groups or classes of society. Social Catholicism claimed a third position between liberalism and 
communism as well as between individualism and collectivism and inspired a specific Christian 
democratic position on property, intermediary organizations and the welfare state. The papal 
encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Qudragesimo Anno (1931) provided a justification of pri-
vate property but also introduced the seminal distinction between private property and its use. 
A repercussion of the principle that private property should be used in social responsibility was 
the insertion of article 14 in the German postwar constitution, ”property entails responsibility“ 
(”Eigentum verpflichtet“), as a base for many state regulations to limit market mechanisms. An-
other repercussion of social Catholicism (in this converging with social democrats’ demands) 
was the concept of co-determination in the German steel industry providing trade unions with 
an equal number on the board of directors (see Misner 2003). 
Furthermore, Catholic social philosophy, often termed ”personalism“, elaborated on the so-
cial embeddedness of the individual in the family and in social groups as a necessary precondi-
tion for the development and personal well-being of the individual (Kalyvas 1996). Thus, Catho-
lic tenets gave a philosophical justification for “intermediary organizations“, to use Claus Offe’s 
(1996) term, long before their importance was rediscovered as being instrumental for economic 
and social development through the production of ”social capital“ (Putnam 1993). It is the em-
phasis on intermediary organizations or “natural communities” (in Catholic parlance) which 
support and/or take over state tasks which distinguishes Christian democratic programs from a 
pure mixture of liberal and conservative policies. A political ideology such as ”Thatcherism“ has 
never been an option for Christian democrats because the Thatcherite vision was limited to a 
liberal market and a small but authoritarian state and even encompassed “an attack on inter-
mediary organizations” (Offe 1996, 324), be it trade unions, local governments, public housing 
or public health service - in stark contrast to social Catholicism.  
Joerg Baudner, Beyond essentialist and functionalist analyses of the politicization of religion 
 
123 
 
Christian democrats’ intermediary, ancillary organizations contributed to seminal economic 
and social developments. In peripheral rural areas with a tradition of wide-spread entrepre-
neurship and small independent farming, they provided the necessary resources of trust and 
cooperation for an economic development based on SMEs and industrial districts, in particular 
in southern Germany and north-east Italy (Trigilia 1988). Christian democracy has also strongly 
influenced a specific type of welfare state which Esping-Anderson in his path-breaking work on 
types of welfare states (1989) classified as conservative or continental welfare states. In con-
trast to the social democratic welfare state in Scandinavia, based on ”social rights“, the Chris-
tian democratic version is rather based on the Christian duty of providing help to the poor and 
regards social policies as secondary and dependent on the achievements of economic develop-
ment (see Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010). Moreover, Christian social tenets have developed 
the principle of subsidiarity, which maintains that help to the individual should be provided by 
the smallest level of organization. As a consequence, the Christian democratic welfare state is 
characterized by its emphasis on intermediary organizations and the family. State-organized as-
surance systems for pensions, health and unemployment are typically organized  by status 
groups and run by tripartite bodies including worker and employer representatives. 
 
 
7. Cushioning free-market policies: social compromise in AKP policies 
 
As in the case of Christian democrats, the reduction of AKP policies to free-market policies 
would be misleading. The reference to religious “social tenets” also helped the National Order 
Parties to develop a cross-class appeal and some of them were kept by the AKP. As in political 
Catholicism, Islamic movements tended to see society as “functionally differentiated corporate 
bodies and not as classes in mutual opposition” (Yildirim and Dinan 2005).  Interestingly, Dinan 
and Cinar (2008, 19) even identified German romanticism juxtaposing the community with its 
sense of belonging against the anonymous market society which was regarded as an erroneous 
historical development (see also Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010), as one of the sources for 
the anti-liberal and anti-western attitude of early political Islam in Turkey.   
Political Islam’s view of industrial relations is firmly entrenched in a traditional view of corpo-
ratism involving management based on shura (council), mutual respect and a sense of responsi-
bility shared by all workers in an enterprise. Despite the general anti-labor mood in Turkish poli-
tics, Islamist parties  initially held a close relationship to Hak-Is, an Islamic trade union, empha-
sized social dialogue and tripartite structures and promised even to promote unionization (Yild-
irim and Duran 2005, 239). 
The economic development in Turkey in the last decade resembles the ”economic miracle“ 
during the Christian democrats’ dominance in western Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s: 
rapid and sustained economic growth and increasing price stability accompanied by limited so-
cial redistribution during the period of the economic take-off and a parting of the ways with 
trade unions. However, although the AKP had tuned down the rhetoric of a ”just order“ (”adil 
düzen“), prominent in the Welfare Party, it continued to stress the pursuit of social justice as an 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(1) 2014: 111-132, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i1p111 
  
124 
 
important theme (“its foremost objective“) in its program (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 100).  
Moreover, the AKP government also recognized the regulatory and social failures of free-
market liberalism, increased social expenditures in critical areas and improved the provision of 
public services; as a result, the rate of poverty decreased from 27 per cent in 2002 to 18 per 
cent in 2009 (Önis 2012,  142).  
At the same time, the AKP’s ancillary organizations continued to have a social function both 
in economic development and in the provision of social services. The social milieu in east Anato-
lia provided a cultural base for entrepreneurship and co-operation among the so-called ”Anato-
lian tigers“, or, to put it in Putnam’s terms, provided the “social capital” to foster economic de-
velopment in these lagging regions. In addition, the Islamic banking system played an important 
role in dealing with the lack of capital supply, one of the main problems of small and medium 
enterprises. International Islamic capital provided only a small part of the capital inflow in Tur-
key, which, however, seemed to have been pivotal in some business development. An im-
portant religious tenet, the condemnation of interest rates, supported the development and 
coherence of Islamic banks, although they started to get around interest rates through novel 
forms of profit and risk sharing (Toprak 2005). 
In contrast to the conservative tradition the AKP espouses, AKP politics are also characterized 
by an emphasis on the participation of civil society, even in the deliberation of constitutional 
reforms and foreign policies. Whereas the AKP’s ancillary organizations remain present in the 
provision of welfare services, there is some evidence that Turkey follows the southern European 
variant of a welfare state characterized by an extensive black economy, a strong emphasis on 
pensions contrasting with a lack of social assistance schemes and a panoply of assurance sys-
tems combined with the nationalization of health systems (Duyulmus 2011; see Kalyvas and van 
Kersbergen 2010)  
 
 
8. From religious to family policies in Christian democracy?  
 
When the economic success after the Second World War brought “affluence for all” (the fa-
mous slogan of the German Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard), religious arguments and jus-
tifications were sidelined or relegated to the background. The interests of religiously based or-
ganizations and the Catholic Church itself were satisfied when the concordats with fascist Italy 
and national-socialist Germany were confirmed and, after decades of sometimes bitter strug-
gles, state subsidies for confessional schools became a wide-spread arrangement among west-
ern European states (Stepan 2001). Moreover, a large part of social services continued to be or-
ganized  by welfare organizations close to the Catholic or Protestant churches. In Italy, the 
Catholic Church kept its monopoly on some welfare organizations until the 1970s (Morgan 
2009). In Germany, the Center Party had already introduced a system of publicly funded welfare 
services provided by religiously based voluntary organizations. For decades following World 
War II, “no social policy could be passed if the two churches were in unanimous opposition to 
it“ (Morgan 2009,  76) and the ”denominational“ sector in the welfare state currently still holds 
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1.3 million employees. The German state even collects taxes on behalf of the churches as de-
ductions from the wage income. 
However, family policies or gender policies (as opponents would put it) retained a major ref-
erence to religious values and were defined in a most traditional way.  Family policies constitut-
ed significant differences between the Christian democratic dominated states of Germany and 
Italy and the Nordic states, but also with France. The Nordic states had embraced female eman-
cipation and had become pioneers in the development of family laws that assigned equal status 
to men and women in the first three decades of the 20th century (Morgan 2009, 67). In con-
trast, after the Second World War the CDU “advocated and enacted an uncompromisingly 
Catholic approach to family structures and social morality” (Conway 2003: 48). As late as  1961, 
the Italian Constitutional Court upheld Article 559 of the Fascist penal code which punished a 
wife’s adultery with up to one year’s imprisonment and a husband's with a mere reprimand. It 
was only in 1975 that a new family code finally established parity between husband and wife in 
Italy (Ginsborg 2000, 440). In Germany, “until 1977, the German civil code explicitly depicted 
women as homemakers, and women had a legal duty to fulfill their home duties before they 
could justify working outside” (Morgan 2009, 76).   
 
Tab.2: Labor market participation in selected western European countries 
 Female employment rate 1994 Difference between male and female 
employment rate 1994 
Germany 55.0 21.7 
Italy 35.6 30.9 
Belgium 44.8 21.7 
Spain 30.2 29.9 
France 51.3 15.3 
Ireland 39.8 25.5 
UK 61.1 13.0 
Denmark 67.1 7.5 
Finland 58.0 2.3 
Sweden 70.9 2.6 
Source: Rubery, J., M. Smith and C. Fagan (1999), Women’s employment in Europe: Trends and prospects, London, 
Routledge, 96-97. 
 
 ”Christian family values“, closely linked to traditional gender roles based on male employ-
ment and female housekeeping (the “male breadwinner-model“), left also significant traces in 
the institutionalization of the welfare state. Mandatory joint taxation of income discouraged 
mothers’ employment and welfare provisions have been related to the work income of the em-
ployee with wife and children being covered by the husband’s insurances. Moreover, the use of 
direct income transfers to the families has starkly contrasted with the Nordic welfare state 
types in which the state provides and organizes child care, thus permitting women to partici-
pate in the labor market. The “de-facto incorporation of the Lutheran Church into the state ma-
chinery” in Nordic countries entailed that “the responsibility for family well-being was gradually 
transferred from the church to the state” (Morgan 2009, 65, 67). Although France started to 
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promote large families in the name of national greatness, French Gaullists were often pragmatic 
with regard to women’s issues and expanded public child care (Morgan 2009). 
The lack of public child care was at the same time the result and the motive for the low par-
ticipation of women in the labor market. At the end of Christian democratic dominance in the 
mid 1990s, the labor market participation of women was in Germany and Italy 20 to 30 per cent 
lower than male labor market participation whereas both were nearly the same in the Scandi-
navian countries (see table 2). Lastly, the emphasis on family values resonated strongly with 
female voters and contributed to the “gender gap” in western European elections until the 
1970s. Inglehart and Norris (2000) singled out Italy and Germany for the strongest gender bias 
in surveys as late as the early 1970s; women’s support for left parties was 13 and 14 percentage 
points, respectively, lower than men’s. Thus, religiously inspired “family values” continued to 
characterize Christian democrats and helped to keep a majority in the female electorate until 
the 1970s.   
 
 
9. From religious to family policies in AKP policies? 
 
One of the path-breaking differences in the policies of the AKP in comparison to its predeces-
sor party, the Welfare Party, was that its party program and rhetoric officially relegated religion 
to the realm of privacy. The AKP leadership even persistently argued that politicization of reli-
gion is dangerous for democracy and religion (Duran 2008,  81). There is also some evidence for 
a shift in attitudes of the Turkish population at the time of the AKP’s ascent to government (alt-
hough it is difficult to prove the causation). According to the Carkoglu-Torprak survey, the num-
ber of supporters of a Shari’a based government dropped from 21.2 per cent in 1999 to 8.9 per 
cent in 2006. Other surveys have supported these results with numbers further dropping if 
asked for the support of specific Islamic regulations (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 31). However, the 
mobilizing role of religious policies was transferred to a number of highly emotionalized and po-
liticized issues, in particular the headscarf ban and the religious Imam Hatip schools. 
After a quarter of a century of total absence of religious education, Imam Hatip schools were 
opened in 1949 following the same curriculum as state schools with additional religious educa-
tion. After reaching its peak in 1996-1997 with more than 500.000 students, the repression of 
Islamic organizations in the so-called “February, 28th process” (in 1998) closed down the junior 
high-school grades and made it nearly impossible for the graduates to enter universities. 
Whereas the AKP refrained from pushing through changes against the veto of President Sezer 
(who retired 2008), regulations and practice were changed in favor of the religious schools in 
the last years. Moreover, the headscarf issue became the most contested symbolic policy mark-
ing the cleavage between the secular and the religious ”camp“, when the AKP proposed during 
its second term in government to abolish the headscarf ban. This regulation was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court in June 2008 and brought forward as major evidence in the (failed) closure 
case against the AKP.  
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The headscarf issue as a symbolic policy did not only concern the role of religious symbols in 
public but also the different values, in particular regarding gender relations,  between the secu-
lar middle classes and the rising “Islamic bourgeoisie”. The concept of the family remained a 
core concept of the AKP’s ideology as “the middle ground where it could merge its moral and 
economic stances”; the party’s ideological support for private property and free enterprise was 
even “presented as a venue to strengthen the family structure” (Tepe 2008, 212). The classic 
division of labor within the family has resulted in the low participation of Turkish women in the 
labor market and the low support of society for it; women’s participation in the workforce de-
creased from 34 per cent in 1988 to 25 per cent in 2008, possibly due to the fall of agricultural 
employment in Turkey (Gerhards 2007). In contrast,  women play a major role in Islamist wel-
fare and other organizations (Altinordu 2010); local organizations have a separate branch for 
women members and women’s group attend training programs “that teach them how to share 
their communication and political mobilization skills and visit orphanages, all on the same day” 
(Tepe 2008, 202).  
However, the number of female party representatives was kept extremely low. The National 
Order Party and the National Salvation Party had with 3.27 and 3.09 per cent respectively the 
lowest number of women candidates and originally only 13 of the AKP’s 384 members of par-
liament were women (Tepe 2008, 202). In contrast, the gender gap in the left-right self-
placement in contemporary Turkey remained significant; women tend to place themselves to 
the right of men (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 443, 449) and the World Value Survey 2008 differ-
entiated the intention to vote for the AKP (44%) with 48 % of female and 41% of male voters.  
 
 
10. Conclusion  
 
A comparison of the development of the parties which originated in political Catholicism and 
political Islam demonstrates a number of communalities; religious tenets and organizations in-
spired the design of a set of policies to “reconcile capitalism and democracy”. The CDU and DC, 
as well as the AKP, integrated formerly excluded social groups in rural and peripheral areas but 
also the urban poor and produced sustained economic growth from which most groups in socie-
ty (albeit to very different degrees) benefited. This did and does not exclude authoritarian traits 
(the 1968 student rebellions in Western Europe were at that time regarded as evidence for a 
profound crisis of the “system”). Moreover, it encompassed traditional if not backward-oriented 
gender policies.  
First, Catholic as well as Islamic parties originated as predominantly mass integration parties
4
 
linked to their electorates of practicing Muslims or Christians by a panoply of religious organiza-
tions and the use of religious tenets. Religious mass integration parties already entailed cross-
class coalitions of the rural nobility, farmers, the rural and urban middle classes and the reli-
 
4
 Christian democrats kept some traits of cadre parties, though, in the periphery and adopted clientelist 
traits in their transformation to catch-all parties in southern Italy. 
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gious part of the workers and urban poor. Whereas in Germany and Italy Catholic parties had 
been set up during the full mobilization of Catholics and gradually lost their capacity to inte-
grate the different milieus, in Turkey the National Order parties originated in the Anatolian pe-
riphery and encroached on the large cities in the 1990s. Religious doctrines entailed anti-liberal 
and anti-capitalist tenets; whereas the “Catholic social doctrine” focused on social corporatism, 
Islamic tenets emphasized ”Islamic” interest-free banking.  
Second, Catholic as well as Islamic parties transformed into (hegemonic) catch-all parties in 
the aftermath of profound national crises which had discredited competing parties to the right. 
The CDU and DC as well as the AKP fully espoused democracy at the same time they shifted to-
wards a pronounced neoliberal agenda (together with an opening towards global markets and 
regional integration); however, they gave them a religious or religious inspired justification as 
combining individual freedom and community responsibility. In this process, Christian demo-
crats obtained the full support (including significant funding) of economic elites and big busi-
ness which had been suspicious towards what sometimes had been called “white bolshevism” 
in Italy and “heart-of-Jesus (i.e. Jesuit) socialists” in Germany. The AKP was (albeit less full-
heartedly) supported by Turkish big business but still had to face the resistance of the state 
elite. At the same time, the influence of trade unions, lower in the case of the AKP anyway, di-
minished.  
Third, neoliberal politics were supplemented and cushioned by social milieus which fostered 
economic development in the periphery, welfare organizations and social policies for workers 
and the urban poor and a participatory role for intermediary organizations. These cross-class 
politics were based on the religious tenets of an organic and just society as well as on religiously 
inspired organizations in business networks and welfare services. In this regard, Islamic banking 
can be regarded as a functional equivalent to mutual aid societies and local saving banks in 
Western Europe. Social policies remain secondary to economic development and are largely 
based on status maintenance or the duty to provide assistance to “those in need”. The corpo-
ratist approach common to Christian democratic parties is less strong in the AKP; however, the 
latter voices a strong emphasis on civil society. 
Fourth, apart from the question of denominational schools, traditional family policies have 
been the most salient reminders of the parties’ religious origins; the low participation of women 
in the labor market in contemporary Turkey rather resembles earlier developments in Italy and 
Germany than provides evidence for a major difference. Christian democratic market-making 
policies stopped short of integrating women in the labor market; the welfare state arrange-
ments incorporated and further strengthened the “male-breadwinner”- conception of their 
gender and family policies. However, by claiming family values, Christian democrats attracted 
until the 1970s a significant majority of female votes and the same (albeit to a lesser degree) 
holds true for the AKP.   
Can we generalize from the comparison that all religious parties take the development ana-
lyzed for the Italian, German and Turkish case? It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze 
religious parties in other parts of the world (see also Minkenberg 2007; Nasr 2005; Stepan 
2001); however, the analyzed cases define scope conditions for the dynamic sketched above. 
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Both Catholicism and Islam represent a transnational religious order which challenges the na-
tion state (Driessen 2013). Paradoxically, it is state repression in combination with social exclu-
sion and conflict which “forces” social movements to organize as mass parties which are closely 
linked to their electorates by associational networks. As socialist parties, these religious mass 
parties can subsequently integrate social groups into the “system”, thus devising not only a 
“reconciliation” of the nation state and transnational religion but also of “capitalism and de-
mocracy”. However, among Western European states there is already one exception: the 
French case. The demise of the Christian democrat MRP (Mouvement Républicain Populaire) has 
been attributed both to its failure to develop into a mass integration party due to the lack of as-
sociationalism and support by the French Catholic Church (Kalyvas 1996; Conway 2003) and to 
its failure to transform into a catch-all party because of a competing political party to the right 
led by General de Gaulle (Warner 2002).  
Whilst it is questionable whether all parties which have been labeled as Muslim democratic 
parties are or have originated from mass integration parties (conservative parties may also have 
taken religious rhetoric on board), Islamic parties in Arab countries such as Tunisia and Egypt 
seem to fulfill the criteria of mass integration parties. As in Turkey, a “progressive” and “West-
ern” state elite built the nation state against the resistance of the imperialist states, subse-
quently ruled the country and produced a liberal bourgeoisie which is strongly opposed to Is-
lamic or Islamist mass integration parties. It seems tempting to expect in the long run similar 
developments as those sketched above. However, there is still one major difference in contem-
porary Arab countries and its impact on party development is yet unclear. Catholic movements 
and parties originated by claiming the middle ground between a conservative-nationalist right 
and a socialist left and this also held true for Islamists in the Turkish party system before its 
transformation in the aftermath of the crisis of 1999-2001. As recent events drastically demon-
strated, this is not the case in Arab countries where from the beginning the state elite (and lib-
eral parties) confronted Islamic mass parties. It remains to be seen which influence this binary 
conflict will have on the development of religious parties.  
 
 
References 
 
Altinordu A (2010), “The politicization of religion: Political Catholicism and Political Islam in 
comparative perspective” Politics and Society 38 (4), 517-551,  
doi: 10.1177/0032329210381238 
Atasoy Y. (2009), Islam’s marriage with neo-liberalism; state transformation in Turkey. Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cinar M. and B. Duran (2008), “Evolution of contemporary political Islam”. In: Secular and Islam-
ic politics in Turkey. The making of the Justice and Development Party, Ü. Cizre (Ed), London 
and New York: Routledge.  
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(1) 2014: 111-132, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i1p111 
  
130 
 
Conway M. (2001), “Catholic politics or Christian Democracy? The evolution of inter-war politi-
cal Catholicism”. Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert, Gehler, M., Kaiser, W and 
H. Wohnout (Eds.), Wien: Böhlau. 
Conway M. (2003), “The age of Christian democracy”, in European Christian Democracy. Histori-
cal legacies and comparative perspectives, T. Kselman and J. A.Buttigieg (Eds.), Notre Dame: 
University Press. 
DiMaio T. (2001), “Zwischen Krise des liberalen Staates, Faschismus und demokratischer Per-
spektive. Die Partito Populare Italiano 1919-1926“, in Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. 
Jahrhundert, Gehler, M., Kaiser, W. and H. Wohnout (Eds.), Wien: Böhlau. 
Driessen M. (2003), Religious democracy and civilisational politics: comparing political Islam and 
political Catholicism. Center for International and Regional Studies Georgetown University 
Qatar. Occasional Paper No.12. 
Duran B. and E. Yildirim (2005), “Islamism, trade unionism and civil society: The case of Hak-Is 
Labout confederation in Turkey“, Middle Eastern Studies, 41(2), 227-247, 
doi:10.1080/00263200500035199  
Duran B. (2008), “The Justice and Development party's new politics”, in Secular and Islamic poli-
tics in Turkey. The making of the Justice and Development Party, Ümit Cizre (Ed.), London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Duyulmus C. U. (2011), “Social security reform in Turkey”, in The EU and the domestic politics of 
welfare state reforms, Paolo Graziano et. al. (Eds), London: Palgrave Mamillan. 
Esping-Anderson G. (1989), Three worlds of welfare capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gerhards J. (2007), Cultural overstretch? Differences between the old and new member states of 
the EU and Turkey, London and New York: Routledge. 
Ginsborg P. (2000),”The politics of the family in twentieth-century Europe”, Contemporary Eu-
ropean History,  9 (3), 411-444. 
Hale W. and E. Özbudun (2010), Islamism, democracy and liberalism in Turkey. The case of the 
AKP, London and New York: Routledge.  
Huntington S. P. (1993), “The clash of civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), 22-49. 
Inglehart R. and P. Norris (2000), “The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and 
Men's Voting Behavior in Global”, International Political Science Review, 21 (4), 441-463, 
doi:10.1177/0192512100214007 
Kalyvas S. N. (1996), The rise of Christian Democracy in Europe, Ithaka and London: Cornell Uni-
versity Press. 
Kalyvas S. N. (2003), “Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization”, in: European Christian De-
mocracy. Historical legacies and comparative perspectives, T. Kselman and J. A.Buttigieg 
(eds.), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Kalyvas S. N. and K. van Kersbergen (2010), “Christian Democracy“, Annual Review of Political 
Science, 13, 183–209, doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.021406.172506 
Kirchheimer O. (1965), „Der Wandel des westeuropäischen Parteiensystems“, PVS 6 (1), 20-41. 
Joerg Baudner, Beyond essentialist and functionalist analyses of the politicization of religion 
 
131 
 
Lipset S. M. and S. Rokkan (1967), “Cleavage structures, party systems and voter alignments: An 
introduction”, in Party systems and voter alignments. Cross-national perspectives, Lipset, 
S.M. and S. Rokkan (Eds.), New York. 
Masala C. (2001), “Die Democrazia Cristiana 1943-1963” in: Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. 
Jahrhundert, Gehler, M., Kaiser, W and H. Wohnout (Eds.), Wien, Köln, Weimar: Böhlau. 
Misner P. (2003), “Christian democratic social policy” in: European Christian Democracy. Histori-
cal legacies and comparative perspectives, T. Kselman and J. A.Buttigieg (Eds.), Notre Dame: 
University Press.  
Minkenberg P.M. (2007), “Democracy and religion. Theoretical and empirical observations on 
the relationship between Christianity, Islam and liberal democracy”, Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 33 (6), 887-909, doi: 10.1080/13691830701432731 
Morgan K.J. (2009), “The religious foundations of work-family policies in Western Europe” in: 
Religion, class coalitions, and welfare states, van Kersbergen, K. and P. Manow (Eds.), Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nasr V. (2005), “The rise of ‘Muslim democracy’”, Journal of Democracy, 16 (2), 13-27,  
Offe C. (1996), „Die Aufgabe von staatlichen Aufgaben. Thatcherismus und die populistische Kri-
tik der Staatstätigkeit“ In: Staatsaufgaben, Grimm, D (Hg.), Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp,  317-
352.  
Önis Z. (2006), “The political economy of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party”, in The emer-
gence of a new Turkey. Democracy and the AK Parti. Yavuz, H. (ed), London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Önis Z. (2012), "The triumph of conservative globalism: The political economy of the AKP era", 
Turkish Studies 13(2), 135-152. 
Özbudun E. (2000), Contemporary Turkish politics. Challenges to democratic consolidation, 
Boulder: Riemer. 
Panebianco A. (1988), Political parties: organization and power, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
Putnam R. (1993), Making democracy work, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Spicka M.E. (2007), Selling the economic miracle. Economic reconstruction and politics in West 
Germany, 1949-1957, New York: Berghahn. 
Stepan A. (2001), “The world’s religious systems and democracy: crafting the ‘twin tolerations’”, 
in: Arguing comparative politics, Stepan, A., Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tepe S. (2008), Beyond sacred and secular: politics of religion in Israel and Turkey, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.  
Toprak B. (2005), “Islam and democracy in Turkey”, Turkish Studies 6 (2), 167-186. 
Trigilia C. (1998), Grandi partiti, piccole imprese, Bologna: Il Mulino. 
Warner C. M. (2002), “Die katholische Kirche als politischer Akteur in Italien, Frankreich, und 
Deutschland“, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft, 33, 279-299. 
Yavuz H (2009), Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 7(1) 2014: 111-132, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v7i1p111 
  
132 
 
 
AUTHOR INFORMATIONS: 
 
Joerg Baudner holds a PhD from the University of Birmingham (UK) and is currently lecturer at 
Osnabrueck University in Germany. He was a lecturer at  Bilgi University Istanbul and a visiting 
researcher at Bogazici University Istanbul and published on German, Italian and Turkish politics 
and policies in leading European journals such as the Journal of Common Market Studies and 
(with M. Bull) Comparative European Politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
